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Abstract:Railroad transportation systems are an area that poses the threat of causing huge risk for both the environment
and people if an error emerges during operation. For this reason, designing and developing relevant products in this
area is challenging. What is more, methods to be utilized for the purposes of minimizing risk susceptibility are to be
specified by international standards. While relevant standards strongly recommend that some methods be utilized based
on the desired safety integrity level during the development phase, some methods are not recommended to be utilized.
CENELEC 50128 strongly recommends the utilization of timed-arc Petri nets during system modeling and the utilization
of formal proof methods during the verification and test phases of the command and control structure developed. In this
study, a control structure related to the safety of the point automation system, which has a critical significance for tram
lines, was designed through timed-arc Petri nets by taking the relevant standard as the reference. The verification was
performed through computational tree logic, which is one of the formal proof methods. The timed-arc Petri nets model
has been used for the first time in this area in this study. Within this context, the structure was developed by taking the
point automation system at the 50. Yıl Station on the T4 Topkapı-Habibler line, operated by İstanbul Ulaşım A.Ş., as
the reference. Moreover, safety requirements for the automation of the points were identified and denoted mathematically
while their safety functions were designed.
Key words: Point automation, safety, formal verification, temporal logic, timed-arc Petri net

1. Introduction
Transportation has become the most important concern for people these days. Railroad systems have come to
the forefront in many countries for the solution of traﬃc and transportation problems in big cities. Accordingly,
the problem has been alleviated. Although the railroad transportation systems remained underdeveloped until
the 1990s, they have great significance nowadays. Investments in railroad transportation systems to alleviate
traﬃc congestion seen on roads of big cities have been on the rise.
Railroad systems are one of the most important means of transportation both for passenger transportation
and freight shipment. Railroad systems enjoy a great number of advantages over other means of transportation.
One of the most important advantages is that railroad system transportation has become safer, more economic,
faster, and environmentally friendly thanks to developing technology. Such advantages prove that railroad
systems enjoy superiority to other modes of transportation for the time being. Safety and reliability issues
become more significant for railroad transportation systems than for roads when the length, weight, and
∗ Correspondence:

1384

cansever@yildiz.edu.tr
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passenger capacities of the trains are taken into consideration. Point automation systems guide the movement
of the vehicles on the tramlines for the safe conducting of vehicles. For this reason, control and automation of
the points should be performed in a safe manner, particularly near the stations, so that casualties and material
losses can be prevented.
Use of formal methods in modeling and verifying signalization and interlocking systems in far more
complicated systems, like railroads, where safety and reliability are of crucial value is strongly recommended
by CENELEC 50128. There exists a great number of studies in the literature regarding the designing of
signalization and interlocking systems using formal methods. In one such study, Winter [1] formed a formal
model for a railroad interlocking system by using communicating sequential processes, which is a formal modeling
language. The author categorized the model into two separate parts, which were the interlocking model and
the signaling model. She also checked the functional specifications of the formal model against the signaling
principles of the formal model, using the failures-divergences refinement model checking tool. By converting
safety properties defined by ladder logic into propositional logic, Kanso et al. [2] conducted a study where
they verified the signalization principles written in ladder logic format. Thus, they managed to verify the
safety properties automatically thanks to the software they developed through verification strategy. Russo and
Ladenberger [3] proposed a new tool, named VeRaSIS, with a formal method base that verified the rail topology
and movement conditions of the trains. This tool enables the graphical simulation of railroad specifications.
In this way, the movement properties of the trains can be automatically produced and verified. Jo et al. [4]
proposed an eclectic approach to incorporate Z (Zed) formal language and ‘Statemate MAGNUM’, which is a
formal method tool, using Statechart. They also applied the proposed method to safety-critical railway signaling
systems for the formal requirement specification and analyzed the specification.
As the verification of the system designed can be made by formal methods, Petri nets have become a formal
modeling tool used frequently for railroad systems [5–8]. Ahmad and Khan [9] modeled the multiple crossing
region near Vancouver station through arc-constant colored Petri nets and identified the safety requirements
for the trains so that they could have safe passing from the region. They also verified such requirements by
coverability tree method. Hei et al. [10] proposed the use of a distributed interlocking system instead of
the traditional interlocking structure they had modeled using Petri nets in their study. They performed the
verification of the proposed system by using the coverability tree method. Giua and Seatzu [11] modeled each
component like the point, track circuit, and station separately. They modeled a railroad network using Petri
nets and designed a supervisory controller in the model formed so that the trains could complete the travel
safely on the railroad network.
The point automation system of the 50. Yıl station on the T4 Topkapı-Habibler line operated by İstanbul
Ulaşım A.Ş. was designed by using timed-arc Petri nets in this study unlike the other formal methods following
the widening of Petri nets. This enabled the modeling and simulation of a time-bound system to act in a more
realistic way. As a result, the movement of points and that of trains in the station occurred within a certain
framework of time. In addition, temporal acts could be transferred into the model better, which enabled the
empowering of the system modeling. It was not possible to form models that were powerful enough to reflect
the system in previous studies since temporal movements in the system were not transferred into the model due
to the fact that timed-arc Petri nets had not been used.
Studies performed earlier considered the system as a whole rather than focusing on the points, which
is one of the most important building blocks of railroad systems [12–14]. This study, however, dwells on the
automation and control of the points. It is important that safety requirements necessary for a safe journey be
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identified and based on a mathematical basis while conducting the automation of the points. In this study the
safety requirements necessary for the automation of points are identified and their safety functions are designed
by denoting such requirements mathematically. Another important issue is to test whether the models formed
to ensure the accurate and safe conduct of the point automation system fulfill the identified safety requirements
or not. Therefore, the TAPAAL editor was used to verify the existence of anticipated safety requirements for
the relevant functions. The verification of the identified safety requirements was made automatically [EF (there
exist some reachable markings that satisfy), EG (there exists a trace on which every marking satisfies), AF (on
all traces there is eventually a marking that satisfies), and AG (all reachable markings satisfy)] and was written
based on the computational tree logic formulation, which is a subcategory of temporal logic.
2. Railway point automation and its subcomponents
As one of the fundamental blocks of railroad systems, points enable the trains to maneuver to the right or left.
They also play a crucial role in ensuring a safer and speedier journey on the rails. For this reason, conducting
the checks of points is as significant as their production and installation into the system [15]. Eﬃciency and
speed of a railroad is highly influenced by the number and form of the points. Reliability of a railroad is
also directly related to the automation and checking of these points. In double track tramlines, performing
the automation safely in places where points are located, rather than monitoring the entire line, is a method
acknowledged today, which is generally due to cost factors. Nowadays, fail-safe command and control of the
points is conducted on tramlines, particularly at stations where points are concentrated. Other components of
the railway in the station also play a significant role in the conducting of point automation at a station. This
section gives a brief introduction of each component.
2.1. Point
A railway point is a mechanical tool that is usually controlled with an electrical motor that lets the trains
be guided from one track to another at a railway intersection according to the desired route. A point can be
settled in two positions, named as normal and diverging. There two positions determined at the mounting stage
and they cannot be changed further. When a route is desired to be formed, the corresponding point is moved
laterally from one position to another by the interlocking system itself.
2.2. Signals
As the brake distance of railway transportation vehicles is more than that of other vehicles, it becomes necessary
to use signals, which enables a safe area between the trains. Signals are systems that transmit colored lights,
notifying the trains regarding the proceeding of the trains until the next signal. Trams operate within a system
where vehicles with low speed run based on double track lines. At this point, notifications of the signals provide
information more so on whether the destination line is available or not as well as the mode of movement (whether
the vehicle will turn toward another direction or go straight forward to the destination) and if the route involves
a place with the point rather than providing information regarding the speed.
2.3. Track circuits
It is important to know which point the trains are at so that railway traﬃc can be managed safely. A track
circuit is an electrical circuit used to detect whether the route is available or occupied by a railroad vehicle. The
relevant mechanism works by using the rails in one part of the road as conductors and short-circuiting the rails
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by the train wheels. Using track circuits has certain pros and cons. The most significant advantage is that it
becomes possible to detect problems like track cracks thanks to track circuits. The disadvantages, on the other
hand, are the interaction that could be brought about by traction currents and problems regarding impedance
bonds.
3. Determination of point automation safety requirements
It is an accepted fact that trains can be easily aﬀected by any disorder in the railway traﬃc. The visibility
ranges are usually not adequate enough to let the locomotive drivers stop the trains; furthermore, stop distances
of a train can vary within a large interval based on total mass. For this reason, railway signaling systems are
developed to control railway traﬃc securely, fundamentally to prevent trains from colliding and derailing as well.
Within this context, with tramlines having double tracks, the conduction of the vehicles is generally performed
via point automation systems. For a safe journey it is important to ensure that the safety requirements are
identified formally. In addition, it should be assured whether the control structure achieved as a result of system
modeling fulfills the necessary requirements or not. It is important to bear in mind that fatal accidents are
bound to happen if there remains an unfulfilled requirement.
The point automation system in this study was modeled by using timed-arc Petri nets, one of the formal
methods based on the CENELEC EN 50128 standard, which was also highly recommended to be used for the
relevant standard. The use of formal methods enabled the safety requirements to be denoted and defined better.
Moreover, verifying the accuracy of the requirements becomes easier as each step will be performed within the
context of an identified rule. Another advantage of using formal methods is that such methods enable one to
do the following: examine the system symbolically, ensure its accuracy, or prove that the safety requirements
are accurate in all states. For all these reasons, formal methods are recommended strongly in the CENELEC
EN 50128 standard. Although the use of mathematical logic is a unifying theme across the discipline of formal
methods, there exists one perfect formal method. Each application might need diﬀerent methods of modeling,
which are communicating sequential processes, calculus of communicating systems, higher order logic, language
of temporal ordering specification, OBJ, temporal logic, the Vienna development method, the Z method, the
B method, and model checking (D.28 formal methods) [16]. In this study, computational tree logic, which is
a subcategory of temporal logic, was used and it was verified that the relevant safety requirements had been
ensured. Safety requirements (SRs) to be fulfilled by the system in point automation projects can be listed as
follows:
SR1. The point should either be in its normal position or in a diverging position as it cannot remain in
the same position concurrently.
SR2. For a point to be locked, the point should either be in its normal position or in a diverging position.
Otherwise, point position error should be noted and the route should not be opened.
SR3. The point should not be moving while the train occupies any point, which means that while the
train is on its way over the point, it should not get any point engine command or move.
SR4. Signals should be locked into green, yellow, and red lights, referring to normal direction, side
direction, and stopping direction, respectively. The train should start moving when the signal notifies about the
proceeding direction, and the signal should give red notification once the train occupies the first track circuit.
SR5. When the route selected is locked and opened, the points on the route should also be locked in the
relevant position and there should be no proceeding until the route is free.
SR6. Points should first be locked based on the route chosen. Then relevant signal notification should
be given when the route is locked.
1387
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The safety requirements mentioned above are depicted as follows, where all the points in the field
are represented as P = {p1 , p2 , p3 , . . . , pi } , all track circuits as T C = {tc1 , tc2 , tc3 , . . . , tcj } , signals
as S = {s1 , s2 , s3 , . . . .., sk }, all probable routes by R = {r1 , r2 , r3 , . . . .., rm } , and trains by TR =
{tr1 , tr2 , tr3 , . . . .., trn }.
I. F : P → Normal ∨ P → Diverging
∀p ∈ P, F (p)
F → pk point is either in normal position or in diverging position.
II. P : R X P → P artof (r, p) → P ointlocked
∀r ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, P (rp)
(rk , pk ) → Pointlocked ∈ P =⇒ (pk ) → Normal ∨ (pk ) → Diverging ∈ F
P → rk pk point is locked on the route specified. The locked pk point is either in normal position or in
diverging position.
III. O : P X T R → Occupied
∀p ∈ P, ∀tr ∈ T R, O(p , tr)
(pk , trk ) → Occupied ∈ O =⇒ (rk , pk ) → Pointlocked ∈ P
O → pk point is occupied by trk train. The occupied point is locked.
IV. K : S → Green ∨ S → Yellow ∨ S → Red
∀s ∈ S, K(s)
(pk , trk ) → Occupied ∈ O =⇒ (sk ) → Red ∈ K
K → sk signal notifies green, yellow, or red.
V. R : R → Routelocked
∀r ∈ R, R(r)
(rk ) → Routelocked ∈ R =⇒ (rk , pk ) → Pointlocked ∈ P
R → rk route is locked. Points on the route are also locked once the route is locked.
VI. S : R X S → Partof (r, s) → Signallocked
∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S, S(rs)
(rk ) → Routelocked ∈ R =⇒ (rk , sk ) → Signallocked ∈ S
(rk , sk ) → Signallocked ∈ S =⇒ sk → Green ∨ sk → Y ellow ∈ K
S → sk signal is locked. The route should be locked for the locking of the signal.
The locked signal indicates either green or yellow.
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4. Timed-arc Petri nets
The timed-arc Petri net is defined with a 7-tuple T AP N = {P, T, IA, OA, T ransport, Inhib, Inv} , where
P is a finite set of places, T is a finite set of transitions, IA ⊆ P x T x T is a finite set of input arcs, OA ⊆ T × P
is a finite set of output arcs, T ransport : IA × OA → {truef alse is a function defining transport arcs that
are pairs of input and output arcs connected to some transition, Inhib : IA → {truef alse is a function
defining inhibitor arcs that do not collide with transport arcs, and Inv : P → T inv is a function assigning
age invariants to places. Here the preset of a transition t ∈ T is defined as ◦ t = [ERR : md : M begChr =
0x007B, M endChr = 0x007C, nP arams = 1] (p, I, t) ∈ IA . Similarly, the postset of a transition t is defined
as t◦ = [ERR : md : M begChr = 0x007B, M endChr = 0x007C, nP arams = 1] (t, p) ∈ OA . Similar to a basic
Petri net a marking M on N is a function M : P → B (R ≥ 0) where for every place p ∈ P and every token
x ∈ M (p) we have x ∈ Inv(p) . Thus, the set of all markings over N is denoted by M (N ) . A marked timed-arc
Petri net is a pair (N, M0 ) where N is a timed-arc Petri net and M0 is an initial marking on N where all
tokens have the age 0.
The enabling rule of a timed-arc Petri net is a little bit diﬀerent from the basic Petri net. t ∈ T is
enabled in a marking M by tokens In[ERR : md : M begChr = 0x007B, M endChr = 0x007C, nP arams =
1] p ∈ ◦ t} ⊆ M and Out =[ERR : md : M begChr = 0x007B, M endChr = 0x007C, nP arams = 1] p′ ∈ t◦ } if
∀ (p, I, t) ∈ IA. ¬Inhib ((p, I, t)) =⇒ x ∈ I and ∀ (p, I, t) ∈ IA. Inhib ((p, I, t)) =⇒ ¬∃x ∈ M (p) . x ∈ I and
( ′)
∀ (p, I, t) IA. ∀ t,p OA.
(
( ′ ))
(
) (
( ′ ))
( ′)
Transport ((p, I, t)) Inhib (p, I, t) , t,p
=⇒ xp = xp′ ∧ xp ∈ Inv p
and ∀ t,p
∈ OA.
′

(¬(∃α ∈ IA. T ransport(α(t, p ))) =⇒xp′ = 0 conditions hold. The firing rule t is enabled in the marking
′

M by tokens In and Out and then it can fire and produce a marking M0 defined as M = (M \ In) ∪Out where
M is a marking on N and t ∈ T is a transition. The time delay d ∈ R ≥ is allowed in M if (x + d) ∈ Inv (p)
for all ∀p ∈ P and ∀x ∈ M(p). For detailed information about timed-arc Petri nets, refer to [17,18].
5. Timed-arc Petri net modeling of points and subcomponents
CENELEC EN 50128 Table A.4-Software Design & Imp. requires the use of a modular approach. Modeling and
design of the system was conducted on a modular basis considering the subcomponents to stick to the relevant
requirement. For this reason, separate timed-arc Petri net models were formed for points and signals. After
that, the models were connected and the timed-arc Petri net model belonging to the point automation system
was achieved. No model was formed for the track circuit. It was integrated into the system as the field model.
5.1. Point timed-arc Petri net model
All points are assumed to be in the normal position at the initial stage. There are five places and four transitions.
Places are for ∀p ∈ P , point model P = {P Enable, RCM, Point N, Point R, RtoN, NtoR} . Transitions are
T = {T0, T1, T2, T3} . The places respectively indicate the following situations: the point is enabled, the
occupancy of the point, the point is in normal position, the point is in diverging position, the point is passing
from diverging position to normal position and the point is passing from normal position to diverging position.
If there is a token of age 0.0 in the place RCM (point track circuit), it means it is occupied; if not, it means the
point is not occupied. Likewise, if there is a token in the P Enable section, it means the point position can be
changed, and if not it means the position cannot be changed. For the point to change position, it should not be
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locked for any route in the enable status and there should be no tokens in the RCM section, which means the
point is not occupied by a train. When enabled, the point moves towards a diverging position. It is required
to achieve diverging position by completing its movement (within a [max1, max2] interval) within a certain
time period. In case it does not achieve a diverging position within a certain time period, this will be identified
as point position error and the intended route will not be opened. The same rule applies for moving from a
diverging position to a normal position. The relevant timed-arc Petri net model formed can be seen in Figure 1.
RCM

P_Enable
[0 , inf)

NtoR

t0
[0 , inf)

t1

[max1 , max2]

Point_N

Point_R
[0 , inf)

0,0

RtoN

[max1 , max2]

t3

[0 , inf)

t2

Figure 1. Point timed-arc Petri net model.

5.2. Signal timed-arc Petri net model
Signals indicate red at the initial stage. There are four places and two transitions: places are ∀s ∈ S , signal
model P = {Signal Enable, Signal red, Signal green, TrEntM} , and transitions are T = {T0, T1} . The places
respectively indicate the following situations: the signal is enabled, the signal indicates red, the signal indicates
green and the train occupies the first track circuit following the signal. After the points on the route to be
opened reach the relevant position, the signal is enabled and a green notification is transmitted to the train to
allow it to pass. As the train passes the signal and occupies the first track circuit, the signal indicates red once
again. The timed-arc Petri net model formed for the signal can be seen in Figure 2.
Signal_Enable
(0 , inf]
t0
(0 , inf]
Signal_red

Signal_green
0,0

(0 , inf]
t1
TrEntM

(0 , inf]

Figure 2. Signal timed-arc Petri net model.
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6. Point Automation System of 50. Yıl Station
Below can be seen the track scheme of the 50. Yıl Station on the T4 Topkapı-Habibler line operated by İstanbul
Ulaşım A.Ş. chosen as a model. The station has five points, five signals, and ten track circuits.
S1
D

RCD

P2

C

P1
Metris

RCC
S2
S3
RCA

P4

P5

P3
RCB

A

B

E
RC

S4

S5
E

Figure 3. The 50. Yıl Station track scheme.

Sets to represent the following items at 50. Yıl Station, whose track scheme is presented in Figure 3, were
defined: five points P = {p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 , p5 } and ten track circuits T C = {RCA, RCB, RCC, RCD, RCE,
RCM 1, RCM 2, RCM 3, RCM 4, RCM 5} , the first of five indicating the entering and departing of the station
and the last five indicating the occupancy of the points, as well as five signals, S = {s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 }. In
addition to these sets, other sets were also defined, such as the set T R = {tr1 , tr2 , tr3 , . . . . . . trn } to represent
the trains and the route set R = {r1 , r2 , r3 , r4 , r5 , r6 , r7 } that can be opened for these trains.
The routes identified can be opened for the trains on the condition that the track circuits are not occupied
and the train proceeding on the second route to be opened should not be facing the train proceeding on the
first route. Based on this, separate timed-arc Petri net models were formed for each route. As an example, the
r1 route timed-arc Petri net model can be seen in Figure 4, formed for a train that will be proceeding on the
CD route.
Point2_N
RCM1

(0,inf]

0,0

Route7_Active

(0,inf]

RCM2
P0

0,0

Point1_N

(0,inf]

t0 Set_Point

Point1_OK
(0,inf]

(0,inf]

t1

(0,inf]

RCD

t2

(0,inf]

(0,inf]
P1

(0,inf]

Set_Signal

t5

(0,inf]

(0,inf] t6

t7

(0,inf]

P2

t3
Point2_R

Point1_R

Route3_Active
Route2_Active

t4

(0,inf]

0,0

(0,inf]

Signal1_Enable

(0,inf]

P1_Enable
RCC

TrEntD
(0,inf]
t8

Route5_Active

P2_Enable
(0,inf]

(0,inf]

P3

Route1_Active

Figure 4. r1 route timed-arc Petri net model.
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Based on the model formed, the r1 route can be opened provided that tc1 (RCC) and tc2 (RCD) track
circuits are unoccupied and the relevant points (Point1 and Point2) are not occupied, either. The former
condition should be fulfilled earlier than the latter. In addition, any of the r2 , r3 , r5 , or r7 routes should be
opened; they should not be locked. The points (Point1 N and Point2 N) on the route are placed in appropriate
positions in the right order once the route is chosen. As a next step, Signal1 is enabled and a green notification
is transmitted. At that point the train starts moving. Any route that might clash with the route of the train,
from C (the entrance point of the train into the station) to station D (where the train leaves the station), is not
allowed to be opened. The same situation applies for all the other routes. A new route can be opened on the
condition that the track circuits on that route are unoccupied and the points are not occupied, either. It is also
required that any other route has not been opened. The Table represents the points, their relevant positions
based on the routes to be opened, and which track circuits are controlled.
Table. Track circuit, point, and point position by route.

Entrance into the station

Route
r1

C

r2

r3

r4
A
r5

r6
E
r7

Controlled point and its
position
P1 → N
P2 → N
P1 → N
P2 → R
P4 → R
P5 → N
P1 → N
P2 → R
P4 → R
P5 → R
P3 → N
P4 → N
P5 → N
P1 → N
P2 → R
P4 → R
P5 → N
P3 → N
P4 → N
P5 → R
P1 → N
P2 → R
P4 → R
P5 → R

Track circuit controlled
RCC, RCD
RCM1, RCM2
RCC, RCA
RCM1, RCM2
RCM4, RCM5
RCC, RCE
RCM1, RCM2
RCM4, RCM5
RCA, RCB
RCM3, RCM4
RCM5
RCA, RCC
RCM1, RCM2
RCM4, RCM5
RCE, RCB
RCM3, RCM4
RCM5
RCE, RCA
RCM1, RCM2
RCM4, RCM5

Track circuits working based on the occupancy principle constantly provide the feed on where the trains
are. This is a condition required for a safe journey. The T C x = {tc1 , tc2 , tc3 } set denotes the track
circuit set occupied by the trains during their entrance into the station for the Metris station, whereas the
T C y = {tc1 , tc2 , tc3 , tc4 , tc5 } set depicts the track circuit set occupied by the trains while they are leaving
the station. With x, y = {1, 2, 3, . . . n} ve x ̸= y , it is assumed that the train remains at the station as long as
it does not pass from a second track circuit based on the route opened after it passes a track circuit. In Figure
5 can be seen the track circuit timed-arc Petri net model, which indicates the actions of the trains that enter
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the station from C. Similarly, timed-arc Petri net models for trains entering the station from A and E were also
formed.

t7

[min1 , inf]

TrEntD
TrEntM1

Point2_N

TrEntM2

0,0

t0

RCC
[0 , inf)

RCM1

t1

0,0

[0 , inf)
[max1 , max2]

[0 , inf)

RCD

[max1 , max2]

t3

t4
[max1 , max2]

[0 , inf)

Point2_R

Signal1_green

f)
, in

[0

RCM2

RCM4

[0 , inf)

t5

[max1 , max2]

t2
TrEntM4

[0 , inf)

t6

TrEntM5

RCM5

[0 , inf)
[0 , inf)

RCA

Signal1_yellow

Point5_N
[max1 , max2]

[min1 , inf]

t10

t8

[0 , inf)

0,0

TrEntA
[max1 , max2]

RCE

Point5_R

[min1 , inf]

t11

[0 , inf)

t9
TrEntE

Figure 5. Track circuit timed-arc Petri Net model for trains entering the station from C.

As specified in the previous section and based on the model formed, the trains entering the station from
C can leave the station from D, A, or E depending on the route to be chosen. The train occupies the RCC track
circuit initially. Then it proceeds on the route opened, occupying one of the track circuits, which are RCD,
RCA, or RCE, and leaves the station.
7. Verification of the point automation system of 50. Yıl Station
It is of great importance to verify and prove that the formed system models fulfill the identified safety
requirements so that a safe journey can be ensured on railway systems. To verify the accuracy of the safety
requirements identified in the point automation system designed for the 50. Yıl Station, the TAPAAL editor
was used. The editor allows the modeling, simulation, and verification of the systems through timed-arc Petri
nets. The verification of the identified safety requirements was made automatically as (EF, EG, AF, AG) and
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written based on the computational tree logic formulation, which is a subcategory of temporal logic. Thus,
it is possible to determine whether the formulae verify the formed model or not as a result of the verification
procedure.
It is examined whether the queries, which were written in the verification process, fulfill the identified
safety requirements or not by considering all reachable markings (AG) in the timed-arc Petri nets model of
the system. The second query, written in SR5, is verified by considering some reachable markings (EF). In
cases where the route r1 is not locked, points can be in their normal position. All queries are checked via the
TAPAAL discrete verification method based on the breadth-first search order in state space. As the coverability
tree is too large, it is not given in this study.
SR1: The point should either be in its normal position or in a diverging position as it cannot remain in
the same position concurrently.
For ∀p ∈ P ,
AG ¬ (N ormal (pk ) ∧ Reverse (pk ))
≡ AG ¬ (P ointk N ≥ 1 ∧ P ointk R ≥ 1)
The property is satisfied.
The points can either be in their normal position or in a diverging position. They cannot remain in the
same position concurrently.
SR2: For a point to be locked, the point should either be in its normal position or in a diverging position.
For ∀p ∈ P ,
AG (P ointlocked (rk , pk ) ∧ (N ormal (pk ) ∨ Reverse (pk )))
≡ AG(Pk Enable = 0 ∧ ( P ointk N ≥ 1 ∨ P ointk R ≥ 1))
AG ¬(P ointlocked (rk , pk ) ∧ (N ormal (pk ) ∧ Reverse (pk )))
≡ AG¬(Pk Enable = 0 ∧ ( P ointk N ≥ 1 ∧ P ointk R ≥ 1))
The property is satisfied.
For any point related to the route chosen to be locked, the point should either be in its normal position
or in a diverging position. The point is locked either in a normal position or in a diverging position as it cannot
remain in the same position concurrently. Otherwise, the point is not locked.
SR3: The point should not be moving while the train occupies any point, which means that while the
train is on its way over the point, it should not get any point engine command or move.
For ∀p ∈ P ,
AG(Occupied (pk , trk ) ∧ P ointlocked(rk pk ))
≡ AG¬(RCM k ≥ 1 ∧ (Pk N toR ≥ 1 ∨ Pk RtoN ≥ 1))
The property is satisfied.
If the point is occupied by a train, the status of the point will never get into the modes of P k .NtoR or
P k .RtoN, which represent the movement of the point used in the model, which goes respectively from normal to
diverging and from diverging to normal. Thus, the point does not move toward a normal or diverging position
while a train is passing over it.
SR4: The signal should be locked into green, yellow, and red light, referring to normal direction, side
direction, and stopping direction, respectively. The train should start moving when the signal notifies about
the proceeding direction, and the signal should give a red notification again once the train occupies the first
track circuit.
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For ∀r ∈ R , ∀p ∈ P and ∀s ∈ S ,
AG (Green (sk ) ∨ Y ellow (sk ) ∨ Red(sk ))
≡ AG(Signal1 green ≥ 1 ∨ Signal1 yellow ≥ 1 ∨ Signal1 red ≥ 1))
AG¬(Green (s1 ) ∧ (Occupied(p1 trk ) ∧ Occupied(p2 , trk ))
≡ AG¬(Signal1 green ≥ 1 ∧ (RCM 1 ≥ 1 ∧ RCM 2 ≥ 1))
The property is satisfied.
Once the train starts moving on route r1 and occupies Point1 and Point2, respectively, Signal1 does not
give green notification. It turns red.
SR5: When the route selected is locked and opened, the points on the route should also be locked in the
relevant position and there should be no proceeding until the route is free.
For ∀r ∈ R and ∀p ∈ P ,
AG¬(Routelocked (r1 ) ∧ (Reverse(p1 ) ∨ Reverse (p2 )))
≡ AG¬(Route1locked ≥ 1 ∧ (P oint1 R ≥ 1 ∨ P oint2 R ≥ 1))
EF (Routelocked (r1 ) ∧ (N ormal(p1 ) ∧ N ormal (p2 )))
≡ EF (Route1locked ≥ 1 ∧ (P oint1 N ≥ 1 ∧ P oint2 N ≥ 1))
The property is satisfied.
In order for route r1 to be locked, Point1 and Point2 should definitely be in diverging positions when all
accessible modes are considered in the timed-arc Petri net model. The route can be locked provided that both
of the points are in diverging positions. Otherwise, route r1 will not be opened or locked. In cases where the
route is not locked, points can be in their normal position.
SR6: Points should first be locked based on the route chosen. Then relevant signal notification should
be given when the route is locked.
For ∀r ∈ R , ∀p ∈ P and ∀s ∈ S ,
EF (Routelocked (r1 ) ∧ (N ormal(p1 ) ∧ N ormal (p2 )))
≡ EF (Route1locked ≥ 1 ∧ (P oint1 N ≥ 1 ∧ P oint2 N ≥ 1))
AG (Routelocked (r1 ) ∧ Green (s1 ))
≡ AG(Route1locked ≥ 1 ∧ Signal1 green ≥ 1)
The property is satisfied.
In order for route r1 to be locked, Point1 and Point2 are locked in normal positions. Then green
notification is given.

8. Conclusion
The point automation system of 50. Yıl Station, chosen as the model, on the T4 Topkapı-Habibler line and
operated by İstanbul Ulaşım A.Ş., was successfully modeled and designed by using timed-arc Petri nets based
on the CENELEC EN 50128 standard. The aim was that the trains would complete their transitions on the
specified line safely. Safety requirements were identified so that the control of the point automation on railroad
transportation systems could be performed in a safe manner. Correspondingly, the model of the system was
formed based on such safety requirements. Eventually it was verified and proven through temporal logic, one
of the formal methods recommended by the CENELEC EN 50128 standard, that timed-arc Petri net models
fulfilled the identified safety requirements.
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ŞENER et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

References
[1] Winter K. Model checking railway interlocking systems. Aust Comp S 2002; 24: 303–310.
[2] Kanso K, Moller F, Setzer A. Automated verification of signalling principles in railway interlocking systems.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 2009; 250: 19–31.
[3] Russo AG, Ladenberger L. A formal approach to safety verification of railway signaling systems. In: Reliability and
Maintainability Symposium; 23–26 January 2012; Reno, NV, USA. New York, NY, USA: IEEE. pp. 1–4.
[4] Jo HJ, Hwang JG, Yoon YK. Formal requirements specification in safety-critical railway signaling system. In:
Transmission & Distribution Conference & Exposition: Asia and Pacific; 26–30 October 2009; Seoul, Korea. New
York, NY, USA: IEEE. pp. 1–4.
[5] Piotrowicz M, Slusarczyk K, Napieralski A. A coloured Petri nets based solution for the generalized railway crossing
problem. In: 14th International Conference on Mixed Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems; 21–23 June 2007;
Ciechocinek, Poland. New York, NY, USA: IEEE. pp. 657–660.
[6] Fanti MP, Giua A, Seatzu C. Monitor design for colored Petri nets: an application to deadlock prevention in railway
networks. Control Eng Pract 2006; 14: 1231–1247.
[7] Cheng YH, Yang LA. A fuzzy Petri nets approach for railway traf?c control in case of abnormality: evidence from
Taiwan railway system. Expert Syst Appl 2009; 36: 8040–8048.
[8] Khana SA, Zafar NA, Ahmad F, Islam S. Extending Petri net to reduce control strategies of railway interlocking
system. App Math Model 2014; 38: 413–424.
[9] Ahmad F, Khan S. Specification and verification of safety properties along a crossing region in a railway network
control. App Math Model 2013; 37: 5162–5170.
[10] Hei X, Takahashi S, Nakamura H. Distributed interlocking system and its safety verification. In: Proceedings of
the 6th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation, Vol. 2; 2006; Dalian, China. New York, NY, USA:
IEEE. pp. 8612–8615.
[11] Giua A, Seatzu C. Modeling and supervisory control of railway networks using Petri nets. IEEE T Autom Sci Eng
2008; 5: 431–445.
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